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We commend Becchio and colleagues [1] for laying out clearly the conditions under which 
mental states might be observable. We particularly appreciate the way in which the authors 
have constrained the definition of ‘direct perception’ such that their strategy “does not require 
perception to be that smart for it to be direct” [1, section 6]. 
Our comment focuses on two issues. The first is the importance of contextual information 
and other previous experience in constraining the observer’s intention judgement. The second 
relates to the crucial role of individual differences in both actors and observers. 
1. Contextual Information and Previous Experience 
1.1 Context-dependent associations influence the actor’s behaviour and the observer’s 
response 
Extensive previous research from the associative learning tradition has shown that context-
dependent associations influence behaviour [10; 9] as well as influencing responses to 
observed behaviours [4; 7]. In the example of understanding intentions from observing 
others’ actions, in a ‘drinking’ context (table laid out for tea-time; [7]) the stimulus ‘cup’ 
would be associated with the ‘drinking’ action and thereby with the underlying ‘to drink’ 
intention. In a ‘tidying’ context (messy table after tea), the same stimulus would be associated 
with the ‘tidying’ action and intention. Thus contextual cues should modulate the observer’s 
intention choice. 
1.2 Previous experience can influence judgements regarding action kinematics 
We have recently shown [2] that previous experience influences how an observer interprets 
another’s action kinematics. Participants completed an action understanding task in which 
they judged the weight of boxes lifted by another person, before and after a period of 
‘counter-mirror’ sensorimotor training. During this training, participants lifted heavy boxes 
while observing light boxes being lifted, and vice-versa. Training significantly reduced 
participants’ performance on the action understanding task, indicating that experience can 
alter the judgements that an observer makes regarding another’s action kinematics.  
1.3 Implications for the strategy 
In relation to the strategy proposed by Becchio and colleagues for measuring the 
observability of mental states [1], these results indicate that contextual information and 
previous experience are important aspects influencing mental state perception. We suggest 
that these aspects need to be integrated into the strategy in order to reflect how kinematics, 
and therefore intentions, are perceived in different situations.  
Specifically, we propose that both contextual information and previous experience will affect 
the starting point z in the drift diffusion model [1, section 4.2]. Depending on the observer’s 
previous contextual associations, when an action is presented within a certain context, the 
starting point of the observation will be biased towards the associated intention. For example, 
in a ‘drink’ context, the contextual information will activate context-dependent associations 
with the ‘drink’ action kinematics and the underlying ‘to drink’ intention. Therefore, even 
when there is no other information indicating what the actor is going to do, the context-
dependent associations shift the starting point towards the ‘drink’ intention, which in turn 
affects the drift rate v, compared to when the action is observed in other contexts.  
Similarly, when considering previous experience, the observer’s previous associations 
between the kinematics of observed actions and the actor’s underlying intentions will 
influence v. As the action starts to unfold, these associations will cause v to accelerate 
towards the decision boundary previously associated with these kinematics, compared to if 
there were no prior experience. Crucially, since previous experience will differ between 
individuals, the relationship between observed action kinematics and v will vary across 
individuals (see section 2 in this Comment).  
Therefore, we recommend that the authors should incorporate this information into steps 2 
and 3 of their strategy. The addition of components relating to context-dependent associations 
and previous experience would take into account how these factors initially constrain the 
observer’s perception of kinematics, as well as the observer’s associated intention 
judgements, which ultimately will determine whether the actor’s underlying mental state (in 
this case, their intention) is correctly perceived.  
2. Individual Differences 
2.1 Intra-individual variability within the actor 
As the authors note, there is considerable variability in motor output, even within one actor 
producing the same intention from one trial to the next. For example, there are many points in 
Figure 1 [1] that are closer to the centre of mass of another intention than they are to their 
own intention. This raises several empirical issues. First, it would be interesting to know how 
the drift diffusion model in Figure 2 behaves when attempting to classify actions such as 
those represented by those points. Second, could the model contain a quantification of the 
actor’s variability, and would this help with classifying non-intention-typical actions?  
2.2 Inter-individual variability across actors 
Becchio and colleagues have previously shown [8] that there are considerable individual 
differences in action kinematics for the same action across actors. In other words, the 
mapping from a particular kinematic feature to a particular intention is not constant across 
actors. It would be interesting to know whether the CART analysis described in step 3 
identifies the same kinematic features for intention discrimination across different actors, and 
whether a model trained on one actor can accurately identify the intentions underlying a 
different actor’s action kinematics. If inter-individual variability is too high to permit 
accurate cross-actor classification of intentions, then we would predict that observers should 
show better intention perception for kinematics with which they are familiar. Such a 
prediction relates to a range of findings, including that participants with atypical action 
kinematics struggle to identify ‘typical’ biological motion [3]; that participants with typical 
action kinematics show reduced ability to identify the mental state expressed by participants 
with atypical action kinematics [5]; and that one’s own action kinematics influence the ability 
to perceive others’ underlying emotional states [6].   
2.3 Inter-individual variability across observers 
The final source of individual difference is in the observers, who will differ in terms of their 
mappings from observed action kinematics to the intention choice that they make. Sources of 
this individual difference include prior experience (as detailed in Section 1 above) as well as 
observers’ own action kinematics (and thus their own associations between kinematics and 
intentions).  
2.4 Implications for the strategy 
We encourage the authors to introduce parameters representing individual difference within 
and between actors, and between observers, into their strategy for measuring the observability 
of mental states. In terms of practical implications, this should allow the authors to determine 
to what extent such individual differences would constrain the usefulness of any robotic 
intention-detection mechanism [1, Box 5]. 
3. Conclusion 
The strategy put forward by Becchio and colleagues [1] is an important starting point for 
improving the experimental study of the observability of other minds. We suggest that this 
strategy could be refined further by incorporating contextual information, and by reflecting 
the constraints that result from variability in both actors and observers. 
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